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Sensor nodes are small devices with limited capabilities. They are used for a 
variety of applications and can be deployed in public environments, which makes 
them vulnerable to physical attacks. An adversary can capture a node, read its 
cryptographic information, replicate these data onto multiple sensor nodes and insert 
them in the network.  
In this thesis, we analyze two methods to detect node replicas in a sensor 
network, namely the randomized multicast and line-selected multicast. Randomized 
multicast distributes location information to a randomly chosen set of witness nodes, 
while line-selected multicast uses the routing topology of the network to detect 
collisions. We derived an analytical solution and conducted simulations to verify our 
   
predictions. The results were at par with our expectations. Both methods detect node 
replication with high probability, but the line-selected multicast algorithm is more 
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Sensors are inexpensive, low-power devices, which have limited 
resources. They are small and have wireless communication capabilities for short 
distances.  They can be deployed on the ground, in the air, under water, on bodies, 
in vehicles and inside buildings.  
The capabilities of the sensor nodes for sensor networks range from those 
of Smart Dust sensors that have only 8 Kb of program, 512 bytes for data 
memory, processors with 32 8-bit general registers that run at 4 MHz and 3 V, to 
sensors that are over an order of magnitude more capable in processing speed and 
memory capacity. 
A sensor node consists of the following basic components: a sensing unit, 




have the following application-dependent components, such as: location finding 
system, power generator and mobilizer. The sensing unit is composed of the 
sensors and analog to digital converters, which convert the analog signals 
produced by the sensors and feed them to the processing unit. The transceiver 
connects the node to the network. The location finding system is used by the 
routing protocols and the sensing tasks to get high accuracy information about the 
location of the nodes. A mobilizer is used for moving the sensor node.  
A sensor network consists of a large number of sensor nodes that are 
deployed without prior knowledge of their exact location. This allows random 
deployment in inaccessible environments and, at the same time, it implies that the 
network protocols should have self-organizing capabilities. Another feature of 
sensor networks is the cooperation between the nodes. They use their processing 
unit to perform simple computations and transmit only the required and partially 
processed data, instead of the raw data. These features enable the sensor networks 
to perform different tasks. They can be used for a variety of applications: 
• Traffic monitoring – the sensors can gather travel speeds, lane 
occupancy, and vehicle counts.  
•  Structure monitoring – sensor nodes can be installed along bridges, 
highways and buildings for monitoring vibration and displacement in 
these structures. 
• Environment monitoring – sensor nodes can be used for flood 




• Military monitoring – sensor nodes can be used for monitoring 
military perimeters 
Most of the hardware for sensor networks is based on RF circuit design. 
Another possible mode of communication between nodes is by using infrared 
communication. The infrared transceivers are cheaper and much easier to build, 
and the infrared communication is license free. Optical communication has been 
implemented in Smart Dust motes, a self powered sensing and computing 
communication system. The disadvantage with the infrared and optical 
communication modes is that they require a line of sight between the sender and 
the receiver.  
Wireless sensor networks architectures are organized in hierarchical and 
distributed structures. In the hierarchical model, there is a hierarchy among the 
nodes based on their attributes and capabilities: base stations, cluster heads, and 
sensor nodes. A base station collects sensor readings, performs costly operations, 
and manages the network. In addition, a base station can be viewed as a gateway 
to another network or as an access point for human interface. Cluster heads 
(usually nodes with better resources) are used to collect and merge local traffic 
and send it to the base stations. Transmission power of the base station is usually 
enough to reach all nodes but sensor nodes depend on the intermediate nodes to 
reach the base station. 
In a distributed sensor network there is no fixed infrastructure and the 




randomly in the targeted area. After deployment, each node uses its 
communication range coverage to find its neighbors and each sensor sends the 
data directly to the sink. Distributed sensor networks are dynamic in the sense that 
they allow insertion and deletion of sensor nodes after deployment to grow the 
network or replace non-functional and unreliable nodes. 
Communication in wireless sensor networks is done in an ad-hoc manner, 
very similar to wireless ad-hoc networks. Likewise, wireless sensor networks 
have dynamic topologies because the communication range and the network 
connectivity changes by time. Some sensor nodes die and others join the network. 
However, sensor networks are more constrained, and much denser than the 
wireless ad-hoc networks.   
Because the sensor nodes are often deployed in accessible environments 
they are exposed to physical attacks, so it is necessary to have security build in the 
design. Sensitive information is delivered in the network and must be protected 
from disclosure to unauthorized third parties. Resource limitations of the sensor 
nodes, lack of fixed infrastructure, unknown network topology prior to 
deployment, high risk of physical attacks, make security in wireless sensor 
networks challenging.   
Confidentiality, integrity and authentication services are critical in 
preventing an adversary from compromising the security of a distributed sensor 
network. Deployed sensor nodes must accept only legitimate queries, commands 




communications, attackers can listen on the radio transmissions, inject bits in the 
channel or replay captured packages. 
An additional issue that sensor networks are facing is resistance against 
node capture attacks. Because the sensors are deployed in accessible areas, it is 
possible that an adversary captures sensor nodes, extracts their cryptographic 
information, modifies their programming and replaces them with malicious nodes 
that are under his control. Moreover, due to cost considerations it is impractical to 
use shielding for the sensor nodes, which would detect pressure, temperature and 
voltage changes that an adversary could use to access a sensor’s internal state. 
This makes it easy for an attacker to capture, replicate and insert duplicated nodes 
in the networks. If the adversary captures at least one node then he can replicate it 
as many time he wants, thus making the network vulnerable. After replicating a 
node, the adversary can send false information and suppress legitimate data. 
Moreover, if the replicas are placed in judiciously chosen locations they can 
revoke the legitimate nodes and disconnect the network. 
 
A Distributed Node-Replica Detection Scheme 
  
Parno, Perrig and Gligor [21] propose two emergent algorithms to detect node 
replication in distributed sensor networks. A node replication attack is an attempt 
by the adversary to insert one or more nodes in the network that have the same ID 




revokes the replicated nodes, so that non-faulty nodes in the network do not 
communicate with the faulty ones. The first algorithm, Randomized Multicast, 
sends location claims to a randomly selected set of witnesses in the network. The 
second algorithm, Line Selected Multicast, selects the witnesses by exploiting the 
routing topology. The algorithms try to minimize the power consumption by 
limiting communication, but still operate within the limited memory capacity that 
is characteristic for sensor nodes.  
 Previous approaches for detecting node replication use centralized 
monitoring, which requires that all nodes in the network transfer a list of their 
neighbors’ claimed location to a central base station that can examine the lists for 
conflicts. The disadvantage of these schemes is that the base station represents a 
single point of failure. If an attacker compromises the base station or interferes 
with its communication then it will fail.  
 Parno et al. present several techniques based on loose time 
synchronizations that reduce the storage requirements of the protocols, point out 
some issues of the public key cryptography, and discuss symmetric alternatives, 
which would require less computational overhead at the price of additional 
communication. 
 The emergent algorithms of Parno et al., which are explained in detail in 
Chapter 3, represent a new approach to the security of sensor networks and can be 




networks, in which nodes can be compromised, replicated and re-inserted by an 
attacker. 
 
Contribution of the Thesis 
 
In this thesis, we derived an analytical solution to determine the 
probability of detecting a node replica in the Line-Selected Multicast algorithm 
and conducted simulations to verify our predictions. The simulations consisted of 
tests on different network topologies. For each topology, we chose a legitimate 
node, inserted multiple replicas in the network, and computed the probability of 
detecting a node-replica. The results confirmed our analytical solution in the 
following areas: 
1. Variations in the number of witnesses affects the probability of detecting a 
node-replica; e.g., using a small number of witnesses the chances to detect a 
node-replica are low. As the number of witnesses grows, we observe that the 
probability of a replica detection increases exponentially. 
2. The density of the network does not affect the probability of detecting a node-
replica, but the size of the network and the routing protocol have a significant 
contribution.  
3. Compared to the randomized multicast case, the line-selected multicast 









 Chapter 2 presents related work and analyzes the shortcomings of prior 
methods. In Chapter 3 we derive analytical solutions for determining the 
probability of node-replica detection in the randomized multicast and line-
selected multicast algorithms. Chapter 4 discusses the results of the experiments 
that were carried out to verify the analytical solution. Chapter 5 concludes the 
























 Previous protocols for detecting node replication in distributed sensor 
networks have relied on a trusted base station to find any conflicting location 
claims or on neighborhood voting systems, which fail to detect distributed 
replications. Centralized schemes require that all nodes in the network send a list 
with their neighbors’ location claims to the base station, which will examine the 
lists for conflicts.  
 Eschenauer and Gligor [11] propose a centralized node revocation method 
in sensor networks by using a simple key pre-distribution scheme. Their key 
management scheme relies on probabilistic key sharing among the nodes of a 
random graph and uses simple shared-key discovery for key distribution, 




space. Each sensor node receives prior to deployment a random subset of keys 
from the key pool and any two nodes able to find one common key within their 
subsets can use that key as their shared secret to initiate communication.  
 When a sensor node is compromised, it is required to revoke the entire key 
ring of that node. A base station broadcasts a revocation message containing a 
signed list of k key identifiers for the compromised key ring to all the nodes in the 
network. After receiving this message, the sensor nodes in the network locate the 
identifiers in its key ring and remove the corresponding keys.  
Eschenauer and Gligor also discuss the resiliency to sensor node capture. 
Usually tamper detection technologies are used to shield sensor nodes in the sense 
that any physical manipulation of the node will cause the erasure of its key ring 
and the disabling of its operation. Although they assume node shielding, the 
authors also prove that their key distribution scheme is more robust than the 
previous schemes (single mission key scheme and pair wise private key sharing 
scheme) in the case of physical attacks against captured unshielded sensor nodes.  
 In the single mission key scheme, if a node is captured then all 
communication links are compromised and in the pair-wise private key sharing all 
n-1 links of the captured node are compromised. In Eschenauer and Gligor’s 
scheme only k<<n keys of a single ring are obtained, which leaves the adversary 
with a probability of approximately k/P (where P is the number of keys in the 




the compromise of one key leads to the compromise of another link with 
probability of 0.3 and of two other links with probability 0.1.  
 Eschenauer and Gligor’s approach is scalable and flexible, given the 
sensor-node computation and communication limitations. Trades-offs can be 
made between sensor-memory cost and connectivity, and design parameters can 
be fit in the operational requirements of a particular environment. 
 Chan, Perrig and Song [5] try to eliminate some of the disadvantages 
associated with the base station and propose the random-pairwise keys scheme in 
which any node can revoke the identity of the neighboring nodes. This method 
enables node-to-node authentication between neighbors and node revocation 
based on voting without involving a base station. Thus, the neighboring nodes can 
broadcast public votes against a detected misbehaving node. For example, if any 
node X observes more than a number of t public votes against some node Y, then 
X cuts all communication with Y. The base station, which listens to the network, 
can send these votes to a secure location where undeployed nodes are stored. 
There any yet undeployed node erases the pairwise keys associated with Y from 
the undeployed nodes’ key rings, thus permanently removing node Y from the 
network.  
 The public voting implies that each public vote should be propagated 
across the network to the voting members, i.e. the set of nodes that can vote 
against the detected misbehaving node, Y. Having each node re-broadcast all 




type of attack, only the voting members will re-broadcast any received public 
votes to each other, while all the other nodes will ignore the broadcast.  
 
The Sybil attack 
 
The Sybil attack is related to the node replication attack. In the Sybil 
attack, a malicious node behaves as if it were a large number of nodes, for 
example by impersonating other nodes or simply by claiming false identities. An 
adversary may also generate a number of additional node identities using only one 
physical device. 
 The Sybil attack was first described by Doucer in peer-to-peer networks 
[10]. Doucer proposed resource testing as a countermeasure against the Sybil 
attack. The resources used for this purpose are computation, storage and 
communication. The first two resources are not applicable to sensor networks, 
because it is possible that the adversary will use a much more powerful physical 
device than the sensor node. Communication testing implies that a request for 
identities is broadcasted in the network and only the identities of those nodes that 
reply within a given time interval are accepted. The disadvantage of this testing 
method is that it causes congestion in the part of network where the verifier 
resides because all the replies will converge to it.  Karlof and Wagner [15] noted 





 Newsome et al. [10] analyze the threat posed by the Sybil attack in 
wireless sensor networks and classify different types of attacks, and the 
countermeasures against each of them. The authors explain how an adversary can 
make use of these different types of attacks to compromise several sensor network 
protocols. Their solutions include radio resource testing, key validation for 
random key predistribution, position verification and registration.  
 Among these solutions, only the centralized node registration technique 
can detect a node replication attack. Such an attack is referred to as an identity 
replication attack, when the same identity exists in multiple places in the network. 
Identities are registered at a central trusted location, which manages the network, 
knows the deployment of the nodes and is able to securely disseminate the 
information to the network. In order to detect a possible Sybil attack, a node can 
poll the network and see if the actual deployment is similar to the one known. To 
validate a node as legitimate, a node can check a list of known good identities, 
thus being able to prevent a Sybil attack. 
 The registration method proves to be a good solution in many scenarios, 
but it has some disadvantages as well. The list of good identities must be 
protected from unauthorized modification. If an adversary successfully 
compromises the list, he can insert identities to the list, thus adding Sybil nodes to 
the network. Moreover, the initial deployment information, with which the current 




that manages the network. In conclusion, the registration method is weak in the 
face of node compromise and has a high overhead.  
 An algorithm for counting the number of nodes in a peer-to-peer network 
is presented by Bawa et al. [2]. They use random samples to compute a statistic 
based on which it is possible to estimate the size of the network. Using the 
birthday paradox, after )( nO  samples are drawn and a duplicate node is 
sampled, the estimate of the network size can be computed. 
 The birthday paradox, which is used in the randomized multicast protocol 
states that for n  independent samples from a set of size n, the probability that a 
pair of samples will have the same value is 0.5.  
 Centralized algorithms are conceptually simple but they have several 
disadvantages. First, the base station represents a single point of failure. 
Compromising the central station or the communication channels around it will 
lead to the failure of the network. Moreover, the nodes located close to the base 
station will receive a large number of packets, thus becoming a target for the 
adversary. Another drawback of centralized detection is the delay in the protocol 
because the base station must wait until it receives all reports, then analyze them 
for conflicts and finally flood the revocations in the network. Using a distributed 
algorithm will make the revocation of replicated nodes much faster. 
 From a security point of view, if all messages reach the base station 




probability one. From a performance point of view, assuming that the average 
path length from a node to the base station is )( nO  and the average number of 
neighbors for each node is d )( nd << , then the protocol will require )( nnO  


































Existing protocols for detecting node replication have relied either on a 
trusted base station to find any replicated nodes inserted by a malicious party or 
on localized voting mechanisms. Neither solution is able to detect distributed 
node replication. In this chapter, we analyze in some detail two detection 
algorithms, namely randomized multicast and line selected multicast, which 
overcome the drawbacks of the previously discussed methods, and allow 
revocation of the subverted node and its replicas. We evaluate each protocol’s 




adversary has inserted a number of replicas in the network. In addition, we will 
evaluate the efficiency of each algorithm from communication and storage points 
of view. Communication bandwidth is extremely important since each bit 
transmitted consumes about as much power as executing 800-1000 instructions 
[15] thus, any message expansion caused by security mechanisms raises the cost 
significantly. Minimizing the storage is also important since sensor nodes have 
limited amount of memory, often in the order of a few kilobytes. 
In analyzing the security of the sensor network, we make the following 
assumptions. We consider the sensor nodes being unshielded, which allows an 
adversary to read their cryptographic information from memory. Afterwards he 
can create replicas by loading this information on different sensor nodes. Since 
the sensor networks are deployed randomly, the clones can easily be inserted into 
different locations in the network. 
The two algorithms proposed by Parno et al. are based on a simple 
broadcast scheme in which each sensor node uses an authenticated message to 
flood the network with its geographical coordinates. If it is assumed that all 
messages reach the destination safely, (this can be assured by using 
acknowledgement messages) then the scheme guarantees 100% detection of 
replicated nodes. However, it has a serious drawback and that is the 
communication cost. Since there are n nodes in the network and each of them has 
to send its location claim to the n-1 remaining nodes, the order of communication 




relatively small, but as n grows, the communication becomes too costly. If the 
schema is modified such that node’s location claim is not send to all n-1 nodes in 
the network and just to a limited set of nodes, called witnesses, then the 
communication cost is reduced.  
The witnesses are chosen as a function of the node’s ID. If a replica exists 
somewhere in the network, then the witnesses will receive two conflicting 
location claims for the same node. If the size of the set of witnesses is g and the 
degree of each node d, then if each of the neighbors randomly picks 
d
gg ln  the 
coupon collector’s problem [8] assures that each of the witnesses will receive at 
least one location claim. This scheme although it reduces the cost of 
communication has a drawback. Since the function for computing the witnesses is 
deterministic, an adversary can predict them as well. If he is able to capture or 
jam all of the messages for the witnesses then he can create as many replicas as he 
wants [21].  
3.2 Randomized Multicast 
 
The randomized multicast [21] improves the simple broadcast example 
from the previous subsection by choosing the witnesses in a random fashion as 
opposed to using a deterministic function to compute them. This prevents an 
adversary from anticipating their identities. Whenever a node broadcasts its 




randomly chosen set of g witnesses. Parno et al. show that the probability of 
selecting the same node more than once is negligible.  
The security scheme used in the sensor networks presented in this thesis is 
an identity based public key system. Each sensor node γ  is deployed with a 
private key 1−γK  and other nodes can verify its signature by computingγ ’s public 
key. This can be done by using its ID, e.g. )(γγ fK = . The traditional public key 
infrastructure whereγ ’s public key would be signed with the public key of a 
trusted authority and distributed to the network is inefficient because it has a high 
communication overhead.  
The location claim of a node γ , γloc  is accompanied by its ID and its 
signature in a message that has the following format: 




  When a witness node receives such a message it will computeγ ’s public 
key and then use this key to retrieve the hash of the ID and the location.  
           { }{ } HlocIDHashlocIDHash
KK




Next, the witness will compute its own hash '),( HlocIDHash =γγ  and 
compare it with the value H . If they are equal this means that the message was 
send by γ  and that it was not corrupted. The next step is to check whether a 




the respective node was replicated so a revocation message is sent through the 
network to revoke the node. The figure below illustrates a conflict situation at a 
witness node.  
 
 
                        Figure 3.1 Randomized Multicast: A witness node detects a node-replica 
 
Following the same reasoning as in the standard deviation of the birthday 
paradox, it is possible to determine the probability that two different location 
claims coming from the same ID will be detected by a witness node [21]. 
We assume that there are L replicas of a nodeα , inserted by a malicious 
party at locations 
L




node α , the probability that there will be no collisions is equal to the probability 
that the intersection of the sets of witnesses, which receive the locations, 
αllll L ,,...,, 21  is zero. 
Each set of witnesses αSSSS L ,,...,, 21  has gdp ⋅⋅ nodes: 
































 We want to find the probability that any two sets do not have any common 
nodes. The probability that none of the recipients of location claim 1l receive any 
of the gdp ⋅⋅ copies of claim 2l is  
(3.1)                                         1                                












































In a similar manner, the probability that the recipients of claims 1l and 2l , 
i.e. the nodes in set 1S and set 2S , do not receive any of the copies of claim 3l  is: 
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1  .                                      (3.3) 
Using the approximation xex ≤+ )1( , we get the following inequality: 
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                                                       (3.5) 
Thus, if  n=3,000, g=55, d=20, and p=0.05 the protocol will detect a 
single replication with probability greater than 0.63 and if there are two replicas 
with probability greater than 0.95.  
In Chapter 4 we will show how this probability changes for different 
values of p, d, and g and for different network sizes and what will be the optimal 
value for these parameters such that the probability of detecting a replicated node 
to be high.  
In the random multicast algorithm, the sensor network detects and defeats 
the node replication in a distributed fashion and by selecting the witness nodes 






3.3 Line Selected Multicast 
 
 Line-Selected Multicast exploits the routing topology of the network to 
select witnesses for a node’s location. The sensor nodes are sensing units as well 
as routers, so when a location claim is send out it passes through several 
intermediate nodes. If the intermediate nodes check for replicas then we achieve 
higher efficiency than in the previous method. When an intermediate node 
receives a location claim it verifies the signature on the claim, then it compares it 
with the location claims already in its buffer and if there is no conflict it stores a 
copy of the location claim and then passes it to the next node on the route. If the 
intermediate node finds that it had already received conflicting location 
information from the same ID, it will flood the network with a revocation 






            Figure 3.2  Line Selected Multicast: An intermediate witness detects a node-replica 
 
 The protocol actually draws line-segments through the network. Each 
node chooses dp ⋅ neighbors, which forward its location to g witness nodes, 
through some intermediate nodes, which we argued that also have the role of 
witnesses. From now on, we will refer to the intermediate nodes, as intermediate-
witnesses and to the initial randomly chosen g witnesses as end-witnesses. The 
paths on which the information is send are the line-segments. 
To find the probability that two line-segments intersect we use the same 
reasoning as in randomized multicast. First, let us consider that we have one 




1l , to gdp ⋅⋅ witnesses. We assume that gdp ⋅⋅ is a constant number r . 
Suppose that the actual claim is forwarded through the routes 
ααα




1 ,...,, rRouteRouteRoute . To have no collisions implies that the routes do not 
intersect with each other.  
Let  
[ ] [ ]ααα rr RouteRouteRouteARouteRouteRouteA ,...,,  and   ... 212112111 =∪∪∪= , 
where 1A  is the set of nodes that receive location claim 1l and 2A  the set of nodes 
that receive location claim αl . Let 1L  and 2L  be the sizes of 1A and 2A . 
The probability that the nodes in 1A do not receive any copies of the claim 
2l  is the probability that any node in 1A  is not in 2A : 














⎛ −≈                                                  (3.6) 
 Let us consider having two replicas of a node, then the probability that any 
of the recipients of claims 1l and αl  do not receive any copies of claim 3l  is: 














⎛ +−≈                                                (3.7) 
The probability of having no collisions is the product of  1ncP  and 2ncP  : 
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 We can proceed in a similar matter for cases with more than two replicas. 
If we assume that there are L replicas of a node, then the probability becomes: 






















c eP     (3.10) 
 Equation 3.10 represents the expression for the minimum probability of 
detecting a replica, for a network of size n. To compute it ones needs to know the 
routing topology of the network and the number of nodes that receive a certain 
location claim.  
 In Chapter 4, we will compare the two methods and we will evaluate their 
performance. Simulations will be conducted on different network sizes, with 
different node densities, and random topologies. The results will be compared 
with the theoretical values obtained in this chapter and will evaluate the 











Since sensor networks operate in a decentralized and self-organizing 
manner and do not rely on fixed infrastructure, it is important to assure that the 
there is a path between any two pair of nodes in the network. This propriety of a 
network is referred to as network connectivity.  
In our simulation, the sensor nodes are deployed at random on a two-
dimensional plane and are uniformly distributed. Two nodes are considered 
neighbors if they are within each other’s communication range. Line-Selected 
Multicast algorithm exploits the routing topology of a network, so if there is no 
path between a pair of nodes, then a location claim cannot reach its destination. 
Therefore, to assure the accuracy of our simulations we must have a connected 
network.  
To guarantee the connectivity of a graph we need to find the minimum 
communication range such that we’ll have a sufficient average number of 
neighbors so that there will be no islands in the network. The connectivity 
depends on the number of nodes per unit area (node density) and their 
transmission range. Each single node contributes to the connectivity of the entire 
network. The correct adjustment of the nodes’ radio transmission power is 
therefore an important feature. Coverage, communication cost and resource 
management depend on the positioning of the sensor nodes.  
A graph G consists of a set of n vertices and a set of m pair of edges. The 
nodes of the network are the vertices of the graph and the connection between the 




A random graph is a graph in which the edges between two vertices are 
established with a probability p: 
     1 2 01 2
1 2 0
1,   ( , )
(       )
0,   ( , )  
if d x x r
p P two nodes x and x are neighbors
if d x x r
≤⎧
= = ⎨ >⎩
 ,        (3.11) 
 
where, 1 2( , )d x x  is the Euclidian distance between nodes 1x , 2x  and 0r is the 
communication range.   
The links between the nodes are established based on their communication 
range, i.e. all the nodes which are within the communication range of a particular 
nodes will be considered its neighbors. If we increase the transmission power of a 
node, it will achieve higher transmission range and thus reach more other nodes 
via a direct link. If the range is very small then it is possible that some nodes 
remain isolated from the rest of the network. 
 Given an ad hoc network with n nodes and a homogeneous node density ρ 
in nodes per unit area, we want to be sure, with a probability of at least p, that no 
node in this ad hoc network is isolated, i.e. each node has at least one neighbor. 







≥                                                          (3.12) 
The node density ρ is computed as the number of nodes in the network 
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A
ρ =            (3.13) 
 In our simulations, we considered that the nodes are deployed on an area 
A=500x500 2m and that the number of nodes n varies between 1,000 and 10, 000. 
In equation (3.12) if we consider different values for p ranging from 0.9 to 
0.99999 we obtain the graph in figure 3.3 which illustrates how the 
communication range varies for different network sizes.  
 
                 
                          Figure 3.3 Minimum communication range for different network sizes 
              
In order to achieve a higher probability of connectivity the communication 




As the size of the network grows the expected number of neighbors decreases so a 
smaller communication range is necessary.  
 Two network topologies are presented below. First figure is an example of 
a disconnected network. We consider the size of network n=500 and using 
equation (3.12) we obtain that the minimum communication range needed to have 
a connected graph is mr 48.410 = . Any communication range under this value 
would lead to isolated groups of nodes in the network. In the second example, we 
choose a communication range higher than 0r  and obtain a connected network.  
 
                




                
                        Figure 3.5 Example of a connected network with 500=n and 450 =r  
 
Analyzing the two figures above, we see that if the communication range 
is too small, the network will be disconnected. Although connectivity and 
message routing are improved by increasing the communication range, this 
implies more energy, thus higher battery lifetime, which raises the costs. 
Therefore, we need to look for an optimal communication range for a particular 
distributed sensor network, and this can be achieved by computer simulations.  
To determine the average number of neighbors within a node’s 
communication range r, we need to find first the probability that a node has i 




If we have n nodes uniformly distributed on an area A with probability per 
unit area p , then the probability of existence of a node on area A is one so, we 
can determine the value of p: 




11 =⇒=∫                   (3.14) 
The probability that a node is within the communication area 2rπ  will be 
2rpπ  and the probability that a node has i neighbors out of n-1 possibilities is: 










neighborsiP ππ                       (3.15) 
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 In Chapter 3 we presented our analytical solutions to the problem of 
determining a node-replica in sensor networks. We will also discusse the 
connectivity of the network, which is an important issue in the line-selected 
multicast protocol, because the probability of detecting a replica depends on the 





















In this chapter, we present the results of our simulations. We have performed 
multiple tests for different network topologies and sizes and compared the results 
with the analytical solutions described in chapter three. The simulation results 
follow very closely the predictions made in the previous section.  
 
4.1 Simulation framework 
 
Simulations were carried out to analyze the performance of the two 
algorithms in detecting a node replica. The simulator was written in Matlab and 




nodes on a square surface of area 500x500m2 and using the derivations for 
network connectivity presented in chapter 3 determined an optimal 
communication range. Table 4.1 gives the value of the minimum communication 
range and the minimum number of neighbors for different network sizes. Since 
our maximum network size does not exceed 7,000, an average of 40 neighbors 
















1000 38.28 18 6000 16.37 27 
2000 27.57 19 7000 15.21 30 
3000 22.75 20 8000 14.28 31 
4000 19.85 22 9000 13.50 34 
5000 17.85 25 10000 12.84 36 
                 
               Table 4.1 Minimum communication range and minimum average number of neighbors 
 
The nodes within the communication range of a specific node are 
considered its neighbors. We assume that a node has at least a legitimate 
neighbor. Without this assumption, the protocols may fail to detect node 
replication. For example, if the adversary captures all of node α ’s neighbors, 
then he can create a replica without being detected, since the neighbors will not be 
able to send out location claims for the legitimate node α . To create a second 




protocol not to detect the replication, for each replica created he must compromise 
d additional nodes. Parno et al. describe a method to thwart this attack using 
pseudo-neighbors [21].  
In our simulations, we considered that the adversary captures a single node 
and creates several clones of it. We made this simplifying assumption because we 
want to measure the probability of detecting one replication. Once we have this 
information we can easily determine the probability of detecting replicas of more 
than one captured node. 
We fixed the position of the legitimate node, and we randomly picked the 
locations of the replicas. In each trial we kept the location of the original node 
unchanged, but modified the replicas’ positions.  The number of replicas was 
chosen between one and six.  
 As a routing protocol between the nodes of the sensor network, we 
considered the shortest path routing protocol [8]. The nodes will have a single 
path on which they will send the packets to the destination node. The aim of the 
shortest path algorithm is to find a route from the source node to the destination 
node that has the smallest number of hops possible. Based on the destination 
address of the information packet, each node keeps a table called NextHop, which 
indicates to which node to forward the packet. For example, a node will store a 







If destination is node 2 then next hop is node 45 
If destination is node 13 then next hop is node 59 
… 
                                                        Table 4.2 Next Hop Table 
 
Some networks use flooding method for routing information. This implies 
that each node sends the packet to all of its neighbors; the neighbors will send it 
further to their neighbors and so on. This approach is very inefficient compared to 
the shortest path algorithm, and it consumes many network resources. However, 
the shortest path method has some disadvantages also. Since each node maintains 
the next hop value for each destination, the approach uses a lot of memory. 
Moreover, the design assumes that the network has a static structure. It would not 
be effective for mobile topologies, because the protocol for determining the routes 
will need to be run each time the topology changes.  
 However, in our simulations we are not concerned with the dynamic 
topologies as our aim is to measure the probability of detecting a replication. For 
this purpose, having just a snapshot of the topology at a certain moment of time is 
sufficient.  
Due to the randomness of our simulation, for each plot point we took 100 
samples. A 95% confidence interval was built at each point on the plot. Assuming 
that the sample mean of m observations is Y , then Y  is an approximation toµ , 




estimate some interval around Y  such that we can predict with some confidence 
that µ  falls within the interval. Thus, the random variable Y is normalized by the 
transformation: 
σ
µ nYZ ⋅−= )(                                                    (4.1)   
where σ is the population variance computed for different plot values. Z has the 
standard normal distribution and by letting 2/αz denote the upper 1002×α/  
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 The random interval 
n
zY σα ⋅± 2/  is the confidence interval and α−1 is 
the confidence level. We considered the value of the confidence interval to be 
0.95, which yields: 96.1025.02/ == zzα [18]  
 
4.2 Results and observations 
 
4.2.1 Randomized Multicast 
 
In Chapter 3, we showed that the lower bound probability for detecting a 















                                         (4.3) 
We are interested in analyzing the behavior of  Pmin  for different values of 
the number of witnesses and for different replicas. In addition, we want to verify 
the accuracy of our predictions by running simulations and comparing the 
experimental results to the theoretical ones. 
      In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we plotted Pmin, for different values of the number 
of witnesses gdp ⋅⋅  and for network sizes 5000=n respectively 7000=n . The 
rate at which the probability increases is proportional to the square of the number 
of witnesses. To find the minimum value for gdp ⋅⋅  such that the probability of 
detecting a node replication is greater than 50% we took 5.0min =P  in equation 
(4.3):  







ngdp                                    (4.4) 
 Equation 4.4 shows that to detect a collision with a probability greater 
than 50% gdp ⋅⋅  needs to be of the order )( nO . This is also obvious from the 
definition of the birthday paradox, which states that for n  independent samples 
from a population of size n, the probability that a pair of samples will have the 
same value is at least 0.5. This implies a relatively high storage cost, because on 
average each node will need to store gdp ⋅⋅ location claims. Similarly, the 
communication requirements are high as well. If we consider that the average 




2n , then the total communication cost will be about )( gdpnnO ⋅⋅⋅⋅ . Since, 
)( nOgdp ≈⋅⋅  we get that the communication cost is approximately )( 2nO , 
equivalent to the ones of the simple broadcast scheme discussed in Chapter 3 [21].  
 
 
               





                  
                                Figure 4.2 Randomized Multicast – analytical solution n=7000 
 
 
 We have run multiple simulations to verify the theoretical derivations. For 
each value of gdp ⋅⋅  and L , we took 100 samples, ran the protocol and averaged 
the results. The reason we took 100 samples was that we wanted to have a good 
estimate for the probability of detection, meaning a smaller confidence interval. 
Our results show that for small values of gdp ⋅⋅  the confidence intervals do not 
overlap but as gdp ⋅⋅  increases and the probability of detecting a replica is 
higher than 90% there are some overlaps (for different values of  L). Overall, the 
confidence intervals turned out to be at a small range of less than 6% deviation 




For the legitimate node as well as for the replicas we choose gdp ⋅⋅  
nodes, which will receive their location claim, and we measured the probability of 
detecting a replica by counting the number of successes out of the total number of 




detection =P                                            (4.5) 
The results are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Comparing the output of 
the simulation with the analytical results, we see a very high similarity. In the 
simulated results the probability of detecting a replicated node has an exponential 
form and is higher than the theoretical result (minimum value), which indicates 
that the analytical formulas in Chapter 3 are valid.   
 































1 replica 2 replicas 3 replicas 4 replicas 5 replicas 6 replicas
 
                              Figure 4.3 Simulation results for Randomized Multicast n=5000 



































1 replica 2 replicas 3 replicas 4 replicas 5 replicas 6 replica
 
                              Figure 4.4 Simulation results for Randomized Multicast n=7000 
 
We also analyzed cases when one of the parameters p, d or g varies and 
the others are constant. The results show that it does not matter how p, d, or g are 
changing, as long as the number of witnesses, gdp ⋅⋅ , increases, the chance of a 
collision increases.    
 
4.2.2 Line-Selected Multicast 
 
In Line-Selected Multicast, the probability of detecting a replica depends 
on the topology of the network and on the routing protocol. For each location, 
dp ⋅ neighbors choose g witness nodes to which they send the information. The 




well. They are also counted as witnesses. In Chapter 3 we found a lower bound 
for the probability of a detecting a replica using line-selected multicast algorithm.   






















c eP                                                       (4.6) 
In equation (4.6), LLLL ,...,, 21  represent the number of nodes that receive 
location claims Llll ,...,, 21 sent by the replicas, and αL  is the number of nodes that 
receive location claim αl  sent the legitimate node α . These values are 
determined as the average of a series of tests. In Figure 4.5, we considered just a 
single node and based on the number of line segments radiating from it, we 
estimated the average size of the set of nodes that receive its location. 
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                     Figure 4.5 Average number of nodes that will receive a location claim 
 
As expected, for larger network sizes since the length of the routes are 




that receive location claims αllll L ,,...,, 21  do not have a fixed size as in randomized 
multicast where the size of these sets was constant gdp ⋅⋅ . Here, gdp ⋅⋅  
represents the number of line segments radiating from a node and each node on 
these segments is counted as witness. 
The minimum probability of detecting a node replica is severely impacted 
by the number of line segments, gdp ⋅⋅ . For small values, the chances of a 
collision are low, but as additional segments are added it grows exponentially, as 
it can be seen from Figures 4.6 and 4.7. 
 
                      













































              







































                           Figure 4.7 Line-Selected Multicast – analytical solution n=7000 
 
We observe that just by increasing gdp ⋅⋅  with one unit, the probability 
of detecting a replica increases at a higher rate than in the randomized multicast. 
The reason is the different interpretation of gdp ⋅⋅ in the two protocols.  
To check the validity of the analytical formulas, we ran a series of 
simulations. In order to detect a collision we need to have at least two line-
segments, transmitting conflicting location information, intersect. In our 
simulation, we generated the line-segments by using the shortest distance routing 
algorithm and then checked to see if any two routes have common nodes. If they 
did, then we marked the trial as successful, otherwise as failure. We repeated the 




We choose 10 random network topologies and for each of them ran 10 
trials. The confidence interval for the various plot points was taken at 95% and 
the results showed 10% deviation from the resulting mean. 
In each trial, we ran the protocol until we obtained a collision. We 
measured the probability of detecting a node replica as: 
                
srepetition ofnumber 
1
detection =P                                      (4.7) 
and then averaged the probabilities obtained for each network configuration. The 
results can be seen in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. 
 
 
               









































































  Figure 4.9 Simulation results for Line-Selected Multicast n=7000    
 
               
By comparing the simulations with the analytical formulas, we see a high 
similarity. The probability has an exponential growth and it reaches higher values 
than the theoretical results, as expected. Thus, it is possible to detect a collision 
with probability 60% just by using six line-segments for a network of size 7,000 
and five line-segments for a network size of 5,000.  
Looking closely at the two protocols, we see that the numbers of nodes 
that actually check for collision are of the same order. If we take the average path 
between two random nodes in a network randomly deployed on the unit square to 
be approximately 2n , we obtain that on average each node will need to store 




Since gdp ⋅⋅  is much smaller than n , the memory cost can be approximated 
with )( nO , which is equal to the memory cost of the randomized multicast 
scheme. The communication cost, will be of the order )( nngdpO ⋅⋅⋅ , and 
because gdp ⋅⋅  is a small constant, the order simplifies to )( nnO . Compared to 
the randomized multicast scheme it is smaller by a factor of n . Thus, Line-
Selected Multicast proves to be more efficient in terms of communication cost, 
which is an important issue in sensor networks. The communication for 
Randomized Multicast scales linearly with the number of nodes, while in Line-
Selected Multicast it grows with )( nO .  
 In Line-Selected Multicast protocol as well as in Randomized Multicast 
we observe that if we keep the number of witnesses gdp ⋅⋅  constant the 
probability of detecting a replica will decrease as the size of the network 
increases. The reason is simple: since the network becomes more populated, the 
chance of two or more location claims to collide at a node becomes lower.  
 We also analyzed cases in which we keep constant the number of 
neighbors dp ⋅ , that send out the location claim of a node, and vary the number 
of witnesses g, and cases in which g was kept unchanged and dp ⋅  varied. Our 
simulation results showed that it does not matter that much whether dp ⋅  changes 
or g changes. The only thing that influences the probability is the product gdp ⋅⋅ . 




collision are higher. In the case of Line-Selected Multicast, this requires a large 
number of line segments, so more nodes will be engaged in the replicated node 
detection protocol. To improve the probability of detection we can repeat the 




























Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 Due to the low-cost nature of sensor nodes, it is impractical to use 
shielding methods that would protect the nodes against access to its memory, 
processing, sensing and communication components. Thus, if the sensor nodes are 
deployed in hostile environments, an adversary can easily capture legitimate 
nodes, replicate and insert replica nodes in the network. This thesis evaluated the 
performance of two distributed algorithms for detection of node replication 
attacks in sensor networks, randomized multicast and line-selected multicast. 
First, we derived an analytical solution for the detection problem, and then we ran 
simulations to verify our predictions. In particular, we studied the probability of 
detecting a node replica in the network for variations in the input parameters: the 
number of witnesses or line-segments and the number of replicas. 
 The results obtained from the simulations were at par with our 




the number of neighbors dp ⋅  that send out the location claim of a node α , led to 
increase in the probability of detecting a replica. We observed that increasing 
dp ⋅  while keeping g constant, or increasing g and keeping dp ⋅  constant led to 
the same results, so in our simulations we varied gdp ⋅⋅ , the total number of  
nodes that receive the location information of  node α .  
In line-selected multicast scheme (LSM), gdp ⋅⋅  represents the number 
of line-segments that radiate from a node α , carrying out its location information. 
Each intermediate node on the route from a neighbor to a randomly chosen 
witness node, checks for replicas as well. Therefore, they are witness nodes as 
well. Our results show that with just a handful of line-segments radiating from a 
node there is a high chance to detect a node replica.  
For each number of line-segments we also gave an estimate on the average 
number of nodes that will receive the location information of a node α . If we 
compare this numbers with the number of witnesses from the randomized 
multicast protocol, we see that in order to obtain the same probability of a 
collision we need about the same number of nodes. The difference is that line-
selected multicast is more efficient in terms of communication overhead. The 
reason is that in line-selected protocol, the intermediate nodes are not idle, and by 
including them in the detection scheme, we do not need to choose additional 
witnesses.   
 Considering that distributed sensor networks are developing fast, the node- 




might use different routing protocols and compare the performance of the two 
algorithms. The results obtained will allow us to study the impact these schemes 
have on different topologies of sensor networks, as well as on choosing the 
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